Even critics concede the CI program has provided valuable learning experiences otherwise unavailable due to budget constraints and the lack of Mandarin teachers at universities and public schools across the nation. Looking to the longer term, there is a need for more development finance to support infrastructure and other public services. How serious is the risk of war over Taiwan? However, U.S.China relations deteriorated in the intervening years. The report said the Johns Hopkins School of Advance International Studies, a major foreign policy education and analysis institute, has received funding from Tung Chee-hwa, a vice chairman of. Chinas investments in smart cities have yielded a major windfall. What impact does great power dynamics have on U.S. efforts to manage the China challenge? According to the 2020 Global Innovation Index, China is now the 14th most innovative country in the world, a major improvement on its 43rd ranking just 10 years ago. In Berlin, the government is working to use ICTs to make the city more efficient, healthier, cleaner, and more sustainable. The ones that are likely to have the greatest effect on rebalancing China's economy fall into four areas: (1) the household registration system (hukou); (2) inter-governmental fiscal reform: (3). The reported ranges examined by The Post were $50,000-$99,999; $100,000-$249,999;. Brookings Institution, not-for-profit research organization based in Washington, D.C., founded in 1916 as the Institute for Government Research by the merchant, manufacturer, and philanthropist Robert S. Brookings and other reformers. Meanwhile, Chinese students are required to learn English from elementary school and as a requirement to gain admission to, and in many cases graduate from, college, with an estimated 400 million Chineseincluding front-line military troopsnow learning English. The initial idea came from outside China. What are the range of Chinese actions in the Indo-Pacific that challenge U.S. security and economic interests as well as those that leave room for coordination and cooperation? Furthermore, in August 2021, the U.S. Senate passed major bi-partisan legislation for American competitiveness against rising China, which included $10 billion in funding to establish regional. Passed in August 2018, the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) prohibited the Pentagon from financing Chinese language programs at universities that host a CI, absent Department of Defense waivers, which have not been granted. In all of these cases, moving forward will involve bringing in ministries across the central governments and state-level officials in both countries. The CI program sent hundreds of teachers to help meet U.S. government goals for Mandarin instruction under the Bush and Obama administrations. Implementation of the U.S.-China Joint Glasgow Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s, issued at the Glasgow Conference of the Parties in November 2021, focuses on the degree to which the United States and China will cooperate on climate issues. In contrast, a 2018 joint Hoover Institute-Asia Society study of Chinese influence activities in the U.S., which acknowledged concerns that campus-based CIs might potentially infringe on academic freedomand made similar recommendations to reduce potential risksfound no actual interference by CIs in mainstream Chinese studies curricula on U.S. campuses and that most CIs operate without controversy. U.S. experts and policymakers cannot operate under the flawed and debunked assumption that China cannot innovate in these emerging technologies. An influential 2017 study of 12 CIs by the National Association of Scholars identified a range of concerns including transparency, contractual language, academic freedom and pressure to self-censor. Chinese capabilities and ambitions have grown substantially to become the second largest economy in the world, largest trading partner for all regional economies, and a formidable military power with sizable and non-transparent defense expenditures. In the strategic competition with China, U.S. alliances and partnerships in Europe and the Indo-Pacific play an important role in enhancing American power. Chinas smart cities market is estimated to be worth more than $1 trillion, and three Chinese entities dominate smart city patents. What are the set of core U.S. national interests that should result in strategic and well-resourced Indo-Pacific initiatives? This, combined with its extensive set of development, infrastructure, technology and energy investments and loansnot just in the developing world, but in emerging markets in Latin America and the smaller economies of Europe is giving China a major platform for leverage and influence within globalization itself, and on global issues. In addition to analyzing the sources of their deepening partnership, the group will explore the areas of tension that remain in the relationship and ask whether there are ways for the United States to exploit those tensions. Hanban contributed start-up funds to, and shared operating costs with, the U.S. partner institution, which also supplied classrooms and administrative support. In 2009, the 973 Program supported 123 new scientific programs and 424 ongoing projects. Can it achieve its ambitions? According to the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), these programs led to the creation of the worlds first light quantum telephone network and advances in low-cost solar batteries. This article was published more than4 years ago. AAUP recommended that universities cease involvement with CIs, which it characterized as as an arm of the Chinese state, unless their agreements are transparent to the university community, afford them control over all academic matters and grant CI teachers the same rights enjoyed by other faculty. What are the kinds of improved deterrent strategies and warfighting strategies for the United States and allies that would mitigate these risksto include different U.S. defense postures in the region, improved innovation and modernization strategies for the American armed forces, and a better-developed concept of integrated deterrence as that incipient concept is now being discussed at the Pentagon and beyond? Regardless of the skepticism that it could do so, China has demonstrated its capacity to innovate and compete technologically on a global scale. These closings and the attendant inflammatory rhetoric exacerbate a national foreign language deficit at a time when training Mandarin speakers familiar with an ever more consequential China should be a national priority. What can the U.S. and its democratic partners do to ensure that the next generation of AI technologies have democratic values such as privacy, transparency, and verifiability baked in by design? In October 2017, the Brookings Institution, one of Washingtons most prestigious think tanks, published a report entitled Benefits and Best Practices of Safe City Innovation. The report included a case study praising the Kenyan capital Nairobi and the Chinese city of Lijiang for implementing new technology in policing. In comparison, as of 2018, only one-fifth of the U.S. population had ever used mobile payments. He is also Special Advisor to the CEO of the Asia Group, Research Director for the McCain Institute's Kissinger Fellowship Series on U.S.-China Relations, and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Yet, interest among U.S. students has been declining since peaking around 2011, as American views of China more generally have plunged to the lowest level since polling began. This working group will examine the impact of Chinas relations with Russia, India, and Europe on Sino-American relations and the U.S. response. What is the range of Americas policy options given its own interests in the region in terms of both economic and security strategy and where can it improve on current policy choices? How does current U.S. policy respond to Chinese influence and strategy in the region? What are the implications of Chinese activity across various strategic domains security, infrastructure, economic statecraft, and more for the United States? But China is not just a growing military power; its also increasingly intent on wielding a combination of diplomatic and economic tools to challenge or reshape the terms and conditions of global order and global governance. The Brookings Institution (Brookings) is a private, non-profit, independent public policy research organization. Powering a Clean Energy Future. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations that advance three broad goals: strengthen American democracy, foster the economic and social welfare, security and opportunity of all Americans, secure a more open . What would the impacts be at home and abroad? [2] This project is a 135MW gas to power plant by Sinohydro (a brand of Power Construction Corporation of China) and Supreme Trading. . According to Open Secrets, Brookings has donated 96% or $824,259 to Democratic candidates and causes since 1990. Chinese universities that participate in CIEF and serve as CI partners are mostly state-funded and, like everything in China, under CCP leadership. Hopes were high when President Xi Jinping appointed Xie Zhenhua as Chinas special envoy for climate change. Other military contingencies involving China, for example those in the so-called gray zone, are worrisome too, ranging from the South China Sea to the East China Sea. Some questions this group will explore include: China is increasingly using diplomatic and economic tools to challenge the terms of global order and governance; how should the United States and others respond? It wasnt long ago that many U.S. government officials and China experts still clung to the idea that Chinese innovation was mostly based on copying U.S. methods and technology. Will Chinas economic slowdown reduce its financing for development elsewhere and otherwise limit development opportunities for its partners? Given this reorganization and CIUSs role, the State Department might revisit its foreign mission designation. (Huawei contributed between $100,000 and $249,000 to Brookings from July 2012 to June 2013.). As tensions between the U.S. and China grew, federal policymakers frequently conflated CI-related academic freedom concerns with a broader set of issues including: Chinese efforts to steal technology, intellectual property and research data; disruptive activities by some campus-based Chinese student associations and Chinas consulates; Chinese talent recruitment plans; and other suspect influence efforts. Despite a bipartisan congressional finding announced in February 2019 of no evidence that these institutes are a center for Chinese espionage efforts or any other illegal activity, the 2021 NDAA broadens the restriction to funding for any program at universities that host CIs. Now, Chinese smart cities make use of an integrated system of physical, information, social, and commercial infrastructure to allow a given city to monitor its citizens and report back through a vast connected network. China's smart cities market is estimated to be worth more than $1 trillion, and three Chinese entities dominate smart city. What steps can the United States take to create a stable financial environment as the dominant shareholder in the International Monetary Fund and the home of the largest private capital markets? In its response to the department, CIUS explained that, although it seeks to foster awareness of CI programs, it does not fund, supply, staff, supervise or serve as a headquarters for CIs in the U.S. As a registered nonprofit corporation, its financials and related organizational details are publicly available through annual IRS Form 990s. What are the implications of Chinas economic expansion and what can the U.S. and others do to set and promote global norms and standards? This rebranding is unlikely to relieve suspicions about the role of CIs in Chinas soft power projection. But China shows what real authoritarianism looks like. The person who wrote the Safe Cities report (along with a former Brookings intern) is Darrell M. West, Brookings vice president and founding director of its Center for Technology Innovation. Prior to a June 2020 reorganization, U.S. universities typically negotiated five-year CI agreements with the MOE CI headquarters, called Hanban, and Chinese partner universities. However, the legal, illegal, and extralegal appropriation of foreign technologies and products is only one part of the story. In short, China has demonstrated its capacity to indigenously innovate, but this capacity has not yet proliferated across all key sectors. The author thanks James Haynes, former Research Assistant, and intern Jingye Huang - Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center, The Brookings Institution, and Mia Shuang Li and research assistant Claire Ren Yixin of the Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center, for valuable research assistance and insights.
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